AUC PAPS 2021-2023 JFA

Sweden has been contributing to an unearmarked pooled funding to the Department of Political Peace and Security (PAPS) within the AU with seven other contributors. Therefore it is not possible to attribute the results of the AU directly to the Swedish financial contribution. The results listed below are described from a broader organisational point of view that Sweden with other partners have contributed to. During the implementation period, the AU PAPS has been working in exceptional circumstances with regards to developments of peace and security in Africa. The spread of Jihadism and its presence in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Somalia & Mozamibique, coup d'états, the dismantling of UN operations in Mali, the outbreak of civil war in Sudan, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and more developments have been severe contextual challenges to the ability of AU to adress the conflicts on the continent. The African Peace and Security Architecture is the formal structure of the AU to deal with peace and security on the continent. At the center of this structure is the AU Peace and Security Council, the continental early warning system, the peace fund, panel of the wise and African Standby Forces. The elements of this structure will be used below to describe and analyze the results of the AU. Peace and Security Council With regards to the work of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a main result is that the PSC has managed to facilitate a consolidated African position on the UN financing of AU mandated Peace Support Operations. The Security Council Resolution was taken on December 2023 and since then joint working groups has been set up to operationalize what this means in practice. This is an important result because it paves the way for greater AU capacity and ownership to handle the many conflicts on the continent. It also integrates the AU to the strenghts of the UN. In addition, it should be mentioned that the PSC has in many cases been able to stand up to the norms that are in the AU Constitutive Act with regards to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). The PSC has reached decision to suspend and sanction those countries that underwent UCG. However, having said that, the PSC has rightfully been criticized for the failure to take action against those countries in which incumbent presidents extent their term in office by constitutional changes. This failure deligitimizes the AU. Further, the crisis in Sudan represents a tragic failure of the AU and the international community. The AU has failed to muster enough strength to deal with the crisis. The responses of the AU has been too weak and has basically been limited to organising meetings within the PSC, establishing a High Level Panel and Expanded Mechanism on the Sudan crisis. Not much has emerged from these platforms, other than communiqées. The AU has not been able to form and lead a united political voice and take initiatives. The first negotiations on a cease fire came from an American/Saudi platform. The unability of the AU to take and consolidate a united position with regards to Sudan has regrettfully contributed to the marginalization of the AU as a credible player with regards to the Sudan, but also other crisis. The Cessation of Hostilies Agreement from 2020 that put an end on civil war in Ethiopia could be considered an exception that showcases the potential peacebuilding role of the AU. But, on the other hand, this agreement came through due to American involvement and the AU had reportedly a marginal role. It can neither be said that the formalisation of the relationship between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the field of peace and security has developed in a significant way. It is important to mention this because this is a key reform issue. Africa Peace and Security architecture needs to be more integrated between the continental and regional level in order for the AU handle its security challenges. However, the issue is still laggering och unresolved. Again, this is partly explained by the lack of political will on behalf of the member states. Security is traditionally seen as an issue of sovereignty. The continental early warning system With regards to another pillar of the APSA system, namely the early warning system, it has been referred to by commissioner Bankole as one of "our greatest headaches" in a briefing on 17/05/2024. One major reason for this is that countries claim sovereignty as a cause for nonintervention. Another reason is that the infrastructure for an earlywarning system is not entirely in place yet. Sida has passed the situation room many times in the AU and found it to be empty. The Panel of the Wise The Panel of the Wise was launched in 2007 and consists of five eminent personalities. The general idea was that these personalities could use their good reputation and relationsships to influence conflict dynamics. It can be argued if this assumption is viable and practicial. Arguably, senior and aging political figures, such as heads of states are not necessarily those best equiped to understand and handle the type of conflicts that modern day Africa experiences. Indeed, the Panel of the Wise has had limited or no influence among coup leaders in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Peace Fund A relative success has been the set up and the financing of the AU Peace Fund. The aim of financing it to 400 MUSD by Member states has nearly been achieved. The governance structure around this fund is robust and has started being operationalized. This is an important development because it shows a level of committment from MS that otherwise can be questioned. The issue of replenishments has not been solved yet. African Standby Forces This concept has not been able to materialized as of yet. In addition, the trend is that Peace Support Operations is becoming more regional. It should also be mentioned that most of the peace operations are very adhoc in nature, with the AU endorsing an operation after it has been set up. The stand by force was envisioned to interfere when there is risk of grave violations of human rights and it should be noted that there has been no intervention in Sudan. Lack of results regarding the reform process The African Union has had a mixed result when it comes to the reform issues on financing. The AU is still a long way of reaching a financial independence. The Assembly decision that MS shall fund 100 percent of the operational budget, 75 percent of the program budget and 25 percent of the peace support operations budget is still far from implemented. MS do fund 100 percent of the operational budget but for example for 2024, the MS financed only 24 percent of the program budget. Some results with regards to result based management The AU is transitioning towards a more result based organisation and taking practical steps to this end. The development of an AU Strategic Plan is one example of this ambition. This document links the seven strategic goals (moonshots) formulated in the Second Ten Year Implementation Plan (STYIP) adopted at the summit of 2024. The Strategic Plan represents a new way of thinking that has the ambition to link strategic goals with means and responsible organization. For each strategic goal, it is stated which entity(ies) are responsible for each goal, which strengthens transparency and accountability. A weakness of the previous plan (First Ten Year Implementation Plan) was that many of the goals were unfunded and also not linked to strategic planning and follow-up. The cooperation between the donor group (organised under the Joint Framework Agreement) and the AUC is also a good result that has developed incrementally. The two parties have developed its relationsship, through the arrangement of trilateral meetings (AUC MS & JFA Partners). This is significant because it offers the opportunity for better coordination and harmonization among partners to the JFA in addition to contributing to more efficient processes. Reporting has improved over the last year of the agreement period. Reports from 2020, 2021 & 2022 were late (several months) while reporting from 2023 was received on time. The delays in reporting has been explained by the AU that the reporting cycles were not convenient to their own internal routines and that the effects from late disbursements of partners. Although, it is evident that the AU can not evade responsibility to agreements it has voluntarily signed to, it is true true that the reporting/disbursement structure has not functioned in an optimal way. In light of this are the agreed institutional contacts between the AU and the JFA partners a good lesson that has been implemented in the new JFA.

Support to AU Political Affairs Peace and Security (PAPS) work to implement the AU Peace and Security Agenda through a donor Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA).