Jemen Peace Support Facility 2019-2022

This is the final and concluding report for the PSF I, summing up all results for the full period of implementation. The fund started to operate in January 2019, as a response to the December 2018 Stockholm agreement. Sida joined 1st of June 2019, after the activation of the so called "national window" (goal 7 and 8 in the strategy), and the assignment was later formalised in the Letter of Appropriation for 2020. No renewed support will be given from the Sustainable Peace strategy, as there is no further governmental instruction on Yemen for the strategy. It is clear from the report that PSF operations have been undertaken in a difficult and fast shifting political environment. To reflect this, it is justified to include the full list of approved but not implemented projects in the report, as has been done. As with previous annual reports, the summing up report is mainly focused on the activity level, without clear linkages to results and outcome-level. However, this report does acknowledge the obvious challenge: that the PSF in the end did not operate in parallel to a peace process. Thus, making the activities not really having an impact on any peace related processes. Stating this does not mean that the PSF has failed to contribute to important outputs, but that some of the identified high external and internal risks became realities, many of them being outside the scope of the facility itself. A notable positive output for the PSF secretariat was its role in the realisation of the Salvage Safer tanker project which really reached high level outcome in terms of the successful transfer of oil aboard the FSO Safer to a replacement vessel avoiding what could have been an extremely serious environmental and humanitarian catastrophe in the region. The financing of the operation itself was managed in a separate funding stream via the PSF. Sida contributed via the specific window for Yemen under the regional MENA-strategy with 30 MSEK (Contribution 15004) and also from the MOFA directly with 20 MSEK. Nevertheless, the Facility played an important role in helping to administer these funds and support the recruitment of staff for the separately managed Safer Salvage Operation Project. Its presence did, in this way, help support a strategic level result that both parties agreed to, although this result was not seen as a part of a peace process as such. Component 1: Initiatives emerging from high-level peace consultations or stemming from interactions with the parties This out-put is attached to infrastructure projects, e.g. the rehabilitation of the ports in Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa and to the salvage of the FSO Safer. The ports have been rehabilitated to pre-war condition in order to secure safe operations, including the inflow of humanitarian assistance. The UNDP sub-office in Hodeidah has worked closely with the specific mission (UNMHA), UN Verification and Inspections Mechanism (UNVIM) and the World Food Programme, WFP, in this mandate. A large part of the operations has been large-scale procurements which indeed has led to better port operations. The out-puts include rehabilitation of the training center, the slipway the maintenance workshop and one oil berth; assessments of electrical installations and gantry cranes; the delivery of spare part for generators, including rehabilitation of the same; a new generator; production of 27 navigation buoys; and the procurement of a new pilot boat (moved over tho the new phase of the project). As mentioned above, the most significant out-put in relation to actual talks and agreements between the parties, finally led by the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, is the support provided by the PSF staff to the FSO Safer operations, including the first stage of implementation, resource mobilisation, technical parameters and operational support. The PSF enabled the UN system to mobilize resources towards addressing the FSO Safer on two separate occasions and in two different approaches. First, in 2020, the PSF was utilized to administer funds and support the efforts with staff. In 2022, following internal discussions within the UN System, the PSF again helped support a renewed approach to address this by administering funds and supporting the initial recruitment and standing up of a separate and dedicated team to work on the FSO Safer. The PSF has, in this way, been instrumental in enabling the UN to remain engaged on the Safer and relatively quickly mobilize resources to support a resolution of the FSO Safer when an opportunity presented itself. While it is possible that a separate facility could have been created for this purpose, this would have taken time and could have risked losing momentum and buy-in amongst the parties. In this sense, the PSF has played an important role, also at the strategic level. An over-arching challenge with this component has been many fold and somewhat contradictory: limited funds of the PSF has not matched the identified needs at the same time as the PSF scarce resources have been tied up in large scale and long-term commitments which with time has had increasingly weak links and priority to the political/peace processes. Component 2: Initiatives emerging from existing Track II dialogues This component has been attached to Trac II dialogues and started in late 2020. Community safety - The OSESGYs Security Sector team led the work to identify and support safety campaigns and community security consultations. It led to the formation of an informal network for civil society organisation in order to hold security actors accountable and to improve local safety. From these some specific projects were funded along three major lines, and it was reported that: 1. Safer school project had focus on safe return of students to schools. A national manual for safety in schools was approved and a MoU was secured between both Ministries of Education and gained authorization. A gender inclusive committees (of 60% women) addressed specific needs of women teachers and students. Training of 95 teachers and staff was undertaken in governorates of Aden, Al-Mahweet, Sana´a, Shabwa and Taiz. 50 schools developed safety response plan (implicating over 50 000 students equally between girls and boys schools). Awareness campaigns, radio and tv included, led to increased demands from imams and community leaders for safety trainings. 2. Human Rights capacity building with local security actors in collaboration with Partner in Law and Policy Group, PILPG, had the focus to improve dialogue and trust between local communities and government authorities. A base line survey was conducted in Aden, Hadramout, Marib, Shabwa and Taiz which formed the point of departure of the programming. Via community forums, dialogue and trainings enhance awareness for various actors, including the police. A major result reported is that the increased women's presences and advocacy led to the appointment of six female police officers being promoted to assistant heads of police stations for a new family protection departments in 8 Aden directorates. 3. Enhanced community safety and protection in collaboration with CIVIC had the focus on the geographical areas of Aden, Marib and Taiz. It established three Community Protection Groups in these areas and trained civilians in harms mitigation, protection and advocacy. The groups meet ones a month to address concerns and to improve relations with security actors. Further activates include women-only trainer of trainer of armed security officers, civil-military dialogues, advocacy campaigns in media and training of security forces. While there are a lot of reported key activities, there are no specific results reported, e.g. what all the reported activities have led to. It is noted that a gender perspective has been successfully applied. Component 3: Eventual interventions related to the transitional governance arrangement post-deal This was decided upon as a place holder and was never activated since there has not been a transitional phase.

Expected Results The peace process in Yemen is supported with fast, flexible initiatives, that deliver tangible, rapid improvements in the daily lives of people, and reinforce and build public support for the political process. Under this output the following components will be implemented (the components have been somewhat altered over the years, but the gist of each window remain): Component 1: Initiatives emerging from high-level peace consultations or stemming from interactions with the parties Component 2: Initiatives emerging from existing Track II dialogues Component 3: Eventual interventions related to the transitional governance arrangement post-deal